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This article analyses the relations between security, urban governance and democratic quality in the light of the fun-
damental theoretical trends and principal empirical researches present in the socio-political literature. After introduc-
ing the theme from a conceptual point of view, the article reviews the interpretations and explanatory hypotheses, 
dwelling on the problems each explanation leaves unsettled. In the conclusion there is a discussion on whether 
urban governance may be considered the most suitable territorial level to improve security policies and democratic 
quality. To this end, an interpretative hypothesis is introduced that challenges the most consolidated explanations 
and opens up new perspectives for research.
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Background
The theme of security is particularly important in the 
development of contemporary democracies. It becomes 
especially salient in the city environment: cities are the 
prevalent subject of attacks against collective security; 
in urban contexts the main social, political and eco-
nomic tensions accumulate relating to the management 
of security; it is above all the cities that experiment with 
the most innovative policy instruments aimed at man-
aging security. In the light of these observations, some 
points are raised that could be summarized in the follow-
ing questions: what are the concepts and dimensions of 
analysis enabling that systematic procedures and deci-
sions on security in the various territorial spheres can 
be examined? Which problems have been opened up by 
the socio-political literature that has theoretically and 
empirically analyzed security policies in a perspective of 
improvement of democratic quality? Finally, can we think 
of the urban dimension as an optimizing dimension for 
improving security policies and the quality of contempo-
rary democracies?
This article aims to respond to the questions formu-
lated above, dealing with them in three parts. In the 
first part, the conceptual foundations are presented; in 
the second part, the issues are discussed that fuel the 
scientific debate on the relations between security and 
democratic quality at different levels of analysis; in the 




In its general meaning, and with reference to human 
aggregates, security, as suggested by the Latin etymology 
of the word, describes behaviors, conduct and attitudes, 
both individual and collective, engaged in (or that can 
be engaged in) sine cura. To be more specific, security, 
understood in the social sense, concerns the conditions 
that allow individuals to carry on their existence without 
worrying, considering minimal or completely absent any 
danger or risk for their physical integrity, for safeguard-
ing their collective and personal effects, and for the pro-
tection of the environment they live and work in.
These conditions are particularly important when indi-
vidual behaviors takes place within collectivities organ-
ized and steered by government authorities. When, that 
is, they are situated in political communities.
In the definition of politics accepted here, as “sphere 
of the sovereign, legitimate, collectivized decisions”, the 
reference to the “vertical dimension” of political activ-
ity is clear, from which, according to Sartori (1980), 
the actual identity of politics and its separation from 
the other spheres of human action springs. As Sartori 
also maintains, thanks to its situation along the vertical 
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dimension “the political sphere becomes elevated and 
circumscribed, in the sense that it is taken back to gov-
ernment activity and, basically, to the State sphere” (Sar-
tori 1980: 206). This reference to the verticality of politics 
implies moreover that: “as long as a political system is 
maintained, the prevalent, binding rules erga omnes are 
and remain the rules issued by political authorities. Only 
political decisions—it is not important if they are in the 
form of laws or not—are applied with binding strength to 
the general mass of citizens” (Sartori 1980: 208).
In the case of organized human aggregates, it is indeed 
the collective need of security, of acting sine cura as 
regards the dangers and risks of uncontrolled violence, 
that expresses the fundamental condition from which the 
essence itself of politics comes down, namely the applica-
tion of a system of government capable of imposing rules 
erga omnes and possible sanctions for those who break 
them. This ability to govern depends, in turn, on two fac-
tors: (a) on the degree of monopolistic control carried 
out over the material and organizational instruments of 
violence; (b) on the degree of acceptance of that power 
by each individual belonging to the community, i.e. the 
degree of legitimacy enjoyed by those holding political 
power.
The guarantee of security provided by an institutional 
subject (the government) entitled to monopolistically 
organize, control and manage violence through spe-
cific structures is manifested in two dimensions. In the 
internal dimension, through the dual requisites already 
mentioned above of possession of the organizational 
resources and instruments of violence and the legitimacy 
of its monopolistic use with all members of the commu-
nity to ensure peaceful order. In the external dimension, 
through those same organizations and instrument of vio-
lence, to safeguard the territorial confines by self-defense 
from the threats of other sovereign states, in a context 
tending towards international anarchy.
If, therefore, the concepts of security and politics seem 
intimately related, it is not surprising that the issue of 
security has stimulated a considerable amount of theo-
retical and empirical researches in all the fields of social 
sciences. With a special focus to political science, we can 
classify security studies according to at least one criteria: 
the political-territorial dimension of security as a public 
good. In fact, it can be said that the territorial extension 
is capable to determine the fruition of the public good of 
security in terms of inclusion or exclusion.
Following this criteria, we can distinguish between 
two different approaches. On the one hand, security can 
be conceived as a universal public good, poorly selective 
on a territorial basis, being available for every individ-
ual—at least potentially—whether or not it is delivered 
by an authority of a political nature. On the other hand, 
security can be conceived as a territorially selective 
public good. The access to this good would be inextri-
cably linked to a specific feature of the political author-
ity (namely the monopoly of legitimate violence), within 
specific territorial contexts.
The first approach to security (intended as a univer-
sal and not-selective public good) includes those stud-
ies that broaden the concept of security, aside from the 
political sphere, to many other spheres of individual and 
collective action (economic, social, environmental etc.). 
Under this approach we can include the so-called “critical 
security studies” (Booth 1991, 2005; Wæver 1995; Buzan 
et al. 1998; Jones 1999; Williams 2003) and the studies on 
“human security” (King and Murray 2001; Burgess and 
Owen 2004; Owen 2004; Newman 2010).
The second approach to security (intended as a terri-
torially selective public good) includes those researches 
that narrow the concept of security only to the politi-
cal sphere, limiting the concept extension to the nation 
State sovereignty and its territorial branches. Fall into 
this approach the studies on “national security” (Wolfers 
1952; Donnelly 2000; Kolodziej 2005), and studies that 
analyse the regional and urban dimensions of security 
(Lagrange and Zauberman 1991; Hebberecht and Sack 
1997; Edwards et al. 2017).
Democracy and democratic quality
To define democracy is a particularly sensitive exercise, 
over which the greatest scholars of politics have strug-
gled, with answers that have not always converged. One 
of the definitions on which there is, however, agreement 
in the literature is the so-called “minimal definition” of 
democracy, which lists the fundamental factors empiri-
cally verifiable and measurable that need to be present, 
all and simultaneously, to call a political regime as dem-
ocratic (Dahl 1971; Linz 1978; Sartori 1987; Schmitter 
and Karl 1993; Morlino 2003). This definition envisages 
that all regimes are democratic which present at least the 
four following requisites: (a) universal suffrage, male and 
female; (b) free, competitive, recurrent and correct elec-
tions, on the outcome of which the election of represent-
atives and governmental roles depend; (c) more than one 
party with guarantees of competition, and opposition; (d) 
different and alternative sources of information. These 
few requisites of a procedural nature must not deceive 
us, for, to be fully satisfied, they require powers, institu-
tions, and articulate, consolidated processes, which show 
that democracy is a complex political regime. It presents 
three complementary facets, though analytically sepa-
rate, and its concrete functioning depends on their com-
bination. The first configures the structure and processes 
of political representation and government functions: 
in a word, the characteristics of democratic politics. The 
Page 3 of 9Tebaldi  City Territ Archit  (2016) 3:17 
second identifies structures and processes of public deci-
sions, namely the ways in which democratic policies are 
formulated and implemented. Both interact with a third 
dimension, that of polity, inherent in the spheres of terri-
torial autonomy and sovereignty both of the central gov-
ernment and of the peripheral institutions.
The three facets of democracy contribute to determin-
ing what Morlino defines as “quality democracy”, namely 
“that stable institutional order which through correctly 
functioning institutions and mechanisms creates free-
dom and equality of citizens” (Morlino 2003: 228). Con-
ceived in this way, the quality of democracies may be 
empirically analyzed in eight analytical dimensions. Five 
are procedural dimensions, since they prevalently con-
cern the rules and only indirectly the contents: rule of 
law, participation, competition, vertical accountability 
(which binds the electors to the elected) and horizon-
tal accountability (which links, in a game of reciprocal 
checks and balances, the constitutional organs). To these 
are added two substantive dimensions, since they spe-
cifically concern the content of democratic government 
action: enjoyment of fundamental freedom rights (civil, 
political and socio-economic) and conditions of equality, 
on both the political plane and the socio-economic one. 
The last dimension is defined as an “outcome dimension”, 
as it concerns the political system’s capacity to respond 
(responsiveness) to citizens’ questions (Morlino 2011).
As is clear from the comparative analyses conducted up 
to now (see, in particular, Diamond and Morlino 2005), 
the data available enable the phenomenon to be framed 
and interpreted both in terms of lesson drawing (hence 
generation of hypotheses) and as a research field fit for 
validating past hypotheses (Tebaldi and Calaresu 2009, 
2015b). As for the empirical size of each dimension and 
the relations running between them, what emerges may 
be summarised in the following points: (a) the centrality 
of competition and participation, which always tend to 
co-vary, as key-factors to supply the development of the 
other dimensions, especially responsiveness, to the point 
of being acknowledged as authentic “engines” of demo-
cratic quality (Diamond and Morlino 2005: xi); (b) the 
close ties between rule of law, accountability (horizontal 
and vertical) and freedom, so that with an increase in one, 
an increase usually occurs in the others; (c) low perfor-
mance, compared with the other dimensions, of the levels 
of equality, except, and in relative terms, in the economi-
cally richer and socially more advanced democracies.
City and local governance
Following a rediscovery of the “local” in the Seventies, it 
was from the subsequent decade that the urban dimen-
sion acquired centrality in political science research pro-
grammes and the city appeared as a unit of analysis and 
an economically and politically important actor (Saun-
ders 1981; Page and Goldsmith 1987; Sharpe 1988) in 
the study of western democracies. Only since the Nine-
ties, however, thanks to the enormous development of 
studies on local and urban governance, can it be stated 
that the city has become a privileged subject of study to 
understand on what conditions and through which inter-
actions a democratic government may be guaranteed 
to be effective and efficient at a peripheral level, in local 
contexts that are increasingly complex economically, 
institutionally and socially (Batley and Stoker 1991; Le 
Galès 1995; Lefèvre 1998; Bogason 2000). This research 
trend, developed above all in the European sphere, fits 
into a period in which the urban-based political actors 
are increasing their visibility and capacity for negotiating 
with the actors on a central and regional scale (Le Galès 
2002), also appealing to the legitimisation and financial 
resources granted them by supranational institutions, in 
particular the European Union.
To define in terms that can be operationalised what is 
meant by the term city and how this unit of analysis can 
be used for empirical analysis, we adopt Pichierri’s (2002: 
48–49) methodological proposal and assume that the 
minimal requisites of the definition of city are as follows:
1. The existence of a territorial area that presents socio-
economically homogeneous features and a local 
intensification of the relations enabling a boundary to 
be established between “inside” and “outside”;
2. The existence of a collective actor (or coalition of 
actors), whose action is the result of collective, legiti-
mised decision-making mechanisms.
To identify the area, the administrative boundaries are 
only a departure point and a reference point. Similarly, 
the collective actor that interests us does not necessar-
ily, less still entirely, correspond to the local government. 
Local government, understood as a set of public institu-
tions with the task of governing in the local sphere, is one 
of the components of a complex mechanism of regulation 
composed on many local actors (institutions and oth-
ers) interrelated with each other, for which the notion of 
governance is used nowadays with increasing frequency. 
With the term governance, applied to the local demo-
cratic context, here is meant “a process of coordination of 
actors, social groups and [local] institutions, for achiev-
ing objectives discussed and defined collectively in frag-
mented, uncertain environments” (Le Galès 1998: 77).
Do politics determine security policy?
The problem of the rule of law
Security in a democracy, as for the other political 
regimes, is one of the essential conditions; we might say a 
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prerequisite, for the application of all the others. For it is 
on collective security and civil order that the ideal social 
contract is founded, which binds members of a commu-
nity to each other, around a form of governing power able 
to guarantee peaceful coexistence. So democracies, too, 
like any other regime, need rules and structures set up to 
guarantee the protection of a social good of such political 
and civil worth. The security phenomenon, at whatever 
territorial level it is analysed, calls without exception for 
the discouragement and repression of crime to be among 
the essential functions of those holding legal power, which 
in democracy is exercised within a rule of law framework.
On this matter, according to the most accredited lit-
erature, it may be stated that the rule of law in quality 
democracies envisages security as one of its most valued 
political products. It is a product, however, that takes on 
qualitative value in democracies when it is accompanied 
by certain elements pertaining mainly to both the cor-
relation between action to prevent/repress crime and 
efficacy of the structures and sanctions in place against 
illegality, and to other conditions that may be clearly 
identified in the definition of rule of law proposed by 
Morlino (2003: 232–233). He specifies that the concept 
of rule of law may not be limited to the “operativeness of 
any legal system”. In effect, very few doubt that “the prin-
ciple of superiority of the law […], a certain, albeit lim-
ited, ability to have the laws respected by the authorities 
in charge of this, the characteristics of non-retroactivity, 
generality, stability and clarity are minimal elements for 
the existence of any civil order”.
According to the definition he formulates, to speak 
of security in an efficient and effective rule of law situa-
tion, a generic reference to an acceptable degree of crime 
is not enough, as this result needs to be combined with 
the organisations and processes by which it is obtained, 
namely the concomitant action of police forces and judi-
cial and prison apparatuses that are efficient and respect 
civil guarantees. All these aspects constitute the set of 
institutionalised rules, procedures and organisations 
around which the penal system of national governments 
takes shape. Thanks to the penal system, the democratic 
rule of law presides, at the level of national politics, over 
the fundamental tasks of discouragement and repression 
of crime. Seen from this angle, the literature going back 
to Weber’s theory of the state indicates civil order and the 
correlated security policies as a fundamental objective 
of modern state organisations, meant in their top-down, 
centralised configuration. As it is an objective derived 
from the centralisation of political power, the conserva-
tion of civil order tends to concern, also in democratic 
regimes, the institutionalised interaction between central 
governments, bureaucratic agencies, judicial and police 
organs and representative assemblies.
It cannot be ignored, moreover, that in recent decades 
the West European democracies have shown, as much for 
decisions on security, as for the management of security, 
a clear tendency towards redefining models of territorial 
governance, the common denominator of which consists 
of delegating important functions of crime prevention 
and control to local powers. On this subject, a decisive 
issue is the generalizability and applicability of decision-
making and management instruments with a decentred 
nature for improving security (and therefore democratic 
quality) in the different territorial contexts in which indi-
viduals operate and relate with each other, with particular 
regard to the urban dimension of social action (Calaresu 
2013; Calaresu and Tebaldi 2015).
The problem of consensus
In order to discourage and prevent crime, however, refer-
encing solely to the rule of law penal system does not fully 
describe the field of action of democratic institutions. At 
least three sectors of public intervention should also be 
mentioned, each distinguished by specific public policies, 
actors and decision-making procedures: the early pre-
vention sector, aiming at intervening in the agencies of 
socialisation most influential in youth, such as the fam-
ily and school; the sphere of social prevention, aimed at 
controlling those environmental factors (quality of social 
life, urban decay, poverty, social atomisation) capable of 
favouring crime; the field of situational prevention, aimed 
at limiting the threats to individual security via dissuasive 
forms and instruments (formal and informal surveillance, 
alarm and control systems) able to increase the difficul-
ties and risks of criminal practices, as well as diminish its 
returns (Barbagli and Gatti 2005).
To say, therefore, that security pertains to the degree of 
effectiveness of the rule of law means to observe only one 
of the vehicles by which it is pursued. Usually, in fact, a 
considerable number of security policies fall not so much 
within the procedural, organisational and regulatory 
measures aimed at suppressing crime, as within the fine-
tuning of public instruments and strategies targeting its 
prevention.
This complex set of problems and decisions consti-
tutes the field of analysis of security policies and inevi-
tably intertwines with the factors of democratic politics 
characterising it on the input side: in the course of the 
processes of formation of consensus and competition 
for the people’s vote. Seen from this side, security may 
be classified as one of the fundamental issues around 
which, particularly from the Nineties onwards, both the 
electoral programmes of political parties and their com-
petitive strategies revolved. In that same period the sali-
ence of the security issue grew exponentially, as much 
in society (in the somewhat simple terms of “perceived 
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security”) as on the political agenda of national and local 
decision-makers.
As is well known, in contemporary times democracy 
has taken on a prevalently representative nature. In this 
sense, it has become configured as the regime of respon-
sibility due to its capacity to respond to social problems. 
The main liberal democracy theories founded the proper 
functioning of the representative mechanism precisely on 
the bonds between accountability and responsiveness.
Democracy, in a procedural sense, is a method of mak-
ing decisions on collective problems. It is, however, a 
method that, in order to operate with full effect, has to 
submit to precise normative and functional requisites: 
the rules that make the delegation of power from many 
to few tolerable and socially acceptable, based on a for-
mal representative mandate. Representatives wishing to 
define themselves as such and to be able to exercise the 
respective decision-making powers, have to have suc-
ceeded in an institutionalised competition that selects 
the competitors, translating the vote of those represented 
into parliamentary seats and/or government roles.
The concept of accountability is the authentic “trans-
mission belt” between the will of the people expressed 
by the democratic competition and the level of respon-
siveness of the government decisions. The winners of 
the democratic contest cannot exercise their govern-
ing power without taking care of the promises made to 
obtain those votes and the expectations of those who 
expressed them in seeing the promises materialise in gov-
ernment policies. Not so much as a contingent fact—the 
vote to be won here and now—as an expectation regard-
ing the future: the legitimate expectation, namely, of the 
representative elected to see his election confirmed in 
subsequent rounds of elections, each time the mandate 
expires. As Sartori correctly pointed out (1987), the com-
petitive theory of democracy becomes a powerful instru-
ment of “payment” between electors and elected, when 
the latter, the incumbents, are conceived in their role of 
candidates for a new election; namely, when responsibil-
ity to the elector is enmeshed in the rules observed by the 
competitors, based on the “rule of anticipated reactions”. 
The challengers, in turn, will be influenced by this way of 
understanding the relationship with the electors, for in 
order to be credible winners in future competitions they 
will necessarily have to promise policies that are not just 
pleasing for the majority, but able to be tangibly realised 
and effectively assessed.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in the relationship 
between the parties (office seekers) and the electors (pol-
icy seekers) a fundamental component consists of the 
continuous search for attractive issues, in terms of both 
political supply and demand. Recent decades have shown 
how important the theme of security has become in the 
dynamics of consensus, so much so as to rise, at certain 
times in the political life of contemporary democracies, 
to being a leading theme in the public debate, ahead 
even of electoral campaigns, at all levels of government 
and above all at a local level. In western democracies, in 
particular, ambitious objectives like the struggle against 
organised crime and the guarantee of greater security of 
citizens have become welded to issues of a social nature 
linked especially with the pressure and widespread fears 
of migratory phenomena, making up a “programmatic 
medley” upon which the promises, remedies and chal-
lenges of the political parties have concentrated.
On this subject, some authors maintain that the pref-
erences and capacities of the dominant actors mould the 
interpretative frames of the social problems, which, in 
turn, determine the perceptions of security and insecu-
rity of the dominated actors. It is through this process of 
manipulation that the threats to security can be ampli-
fied, with a contagious effect, to reach the threshold of 
social alarm; and it is through this mechanism that the 
need for security can be turned into a strategy of securiti-
sation (Wæver 1996).
Following this perspective, any problem may conse-
quently become a security issue on the grounds of an 
evaluation and choice carried out by a “judging subject” 
(a governor, state actor, the heads of an administrative 
agency or military body, a political party élite, the lead-
ers of an opposition movement, etc.) capable of raising 
it to the rank of “existential threat” for a specific “refer-
ent object” (the community or a part of it, the regime, 
organs of state, production facilities or processes, social 
groups, etc.), to fuel a socially widespread perception of 
it and thus determine its “securitisation”. Once an issue 
is “securitised” it obtains, due to its gravity and urgency, 
a higher status compared with ordinary issues. This 
enables, in turn, superordinate placing on the political 
agenda of those governing and immediate entry among 
the extremely urgent policy problems; this leads to 
the possibility granted to decision makers to use emer-
gency procedures able to surpass the normal procedural, 
administrative and legislative ties.
The problem of participation
Observing the practicality of the representative circuit, 
few people have doubts on the necessary presence of a 
certain degree of participation, if and when citizens have 
the chance, for good democratic functioning, namely to 
express disagreement or consensus on the decision-mak-
ers and decisions concerned. This statement, apparently 
taken for granted, nevertheless nurtures some dilem-
mas of a theoretical and methodological nature. For if it 
is assumed that modern democracies have an eminently 
representative character, where an important part of 
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public decisions are made by agents elected by the peo-
ple and delegated by them to govern, it is however just 
as true that the different empirical theories of democracy 
cannot ignore the existence of a certain degree of tension 
between the concept of representation and that of partic-
ipation. Those who emphasise the clear prevalence of the 
former in the concrete evolution of current democratic 
regimes are countered by those who, though not ignor-
ing the crucial role of the representative phenomenon, 
underline the need to improve the functioning of democ-
racies, increasing the opportunities for institutionalised 
political participation beyond the classic channels of rep-
resentation: both to grant greater legitimacy to the repre-
sentatives, and to sustain them in their decision-making 
function, and again, to involve the decision-takers in the 
phases of drawing-up the political agenda and imple-
menting the public decisions. This appears particularly 
important when attention is paid to complex, controver-
sial decisions like those involved in security and public 
order, the results of which are felt in an extremely urgent 
(and often distorted) way by public opinion and organ-
ised citizenship, to the extent that applications are some-
times made for self-protection for security at a territorial 
level.
For this reason, those engaged in politics today, be it at 
a professional-administrative level or from a scientific-
explanatory point of view, have become increasingly 
interested in understanding how, why and to what extent 
the coupling of new participatory instruments with the 
principle of delegation and representation can improve 
the quality of democracy as regards the production of 
efficient, fair policies. In particular, the interdisciplinary 
debate has led to three alternative forms of participa-
tion, potentially capable of subtracting the democratic 
political process from the negative effects produced both 
by generalised apathy and by the progressive success of 
the NIMBY syndrome. We are referring to direct par-
ticipation within the sphere of deliberative democracy 
mechanisms; to mediated participation by groups in the 
processes of contractual democracy; to the selective par-
ticipation of groups and institutions at decision-making 
tables regulated by pactional and contractual instruments 
(Calaresu 2012, 2016).
When referred to the theme of security, the latter 
remarks take on particular importance, above all when 
they appear to be nurturing a serious challenge to that 
consolidated tradition of thought going back to Weber’s 
theory of the state, already mentioned earlier. Although 
this theory indicates civil order as a fundamental objec-
tive of modern state organisations, understood in their 
top-down, centralised configuration, it is a model that 
seems nowadays to lose an explanatory capacity, where 
new participatory forms of a pactional and contractual 
type are observed that delegate important crime preven-
tion and control functions to local powers.
It is clearly a case of issues that correlate a large num-
ber of variables between them, the resolution of which 
cannot, however, disregard an adequate configuration of 
the territorial coordinates that regulate the participatory 
behaviours of local subjects and institutions, delimit-
ing what we might define, due to its polyedricity and the 
composite spectrum of its empirically observable ele-
ments, the “spatial prism” of security policies.
On the theoretical plane this connection provides some 
research questions that we can summarise as follows: 
how and how much does the territorial variable concur in 
sketching out the salient aspects of the institutionalised 
participation of groups and local authorities in security 
policies? How much do the ties and opportunities linked 
with the city territory count in sanctioning, legitimis-
ing and strengthening these participatory spaces? What 
relation is there, finally, between centre-periphery logics 
and the quality of the decisions made when a public good 
is at stake that particularly characterises the interaction 
between individual and territory, i.e. the security of the 
physical space in which we live?
Does polity determine security policy?
The problem of citizenship
Before going ahead, it is worth focusing on some theo-
retical and conceptual cornerstones usually used to 
explain the degree of interaction and reciprocal influence 
between the dimension of physical space (what we have 
previously called the polity dimension) and the partici-
patory dimension of the democratic political processes 
that lead to binding decisions on individual and collective 
security.
The intertwining of these factors belongs to a com-
plex problem that since classical times has attracted the 
main authors on political thought, and continues today to 
involve—opening up many areas of interaction and con-
tamination—just as much the social sciences as the ter-
ritorial sciences.
Whether it is described as government by the people or 
read in terms of government for the people, the concept 
of representative democracy, conceived in the classical 
liberal-electoral sense, seems to justify individual politi-
cal participation based on clear territorial delimitation. 
The concept of citizenship cannot, in effect, be expressed 
without reference to a territory of belonging, a specific 
democratic polity, to a physical space, as well as political, 
that delimits the exercise of the rights of participation. 
For Aristotle this space is the polis, the city, from which 
comes the concept itself of citizenship; in modern times, 
democratic polity has corresponded to the national state 
and its internal territorial divisions, though new forms of 
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citizenship are developing that belong to territorial char-
acters of a supranational nature (above all, the European 
Union).
It is true, nevertheless, that the simple juxtaposition 
of political rights and citizenship does not satisfactorily 
reveal the complexity of democratic action; above all, it 
does not manage to throw full light on the spatial prism 
of democracy, where, in particular, participative behav-
iours from the bottom can be observed of individu-
als operating within specific territorial areas (especially 
within the urban dimension), even if they do not organi-
cally and legally possess the status of citizens of that spe-
cific territory. Indeed, if we begin with this remark, the 
participatory forms with the highest rate of inclusiveness, 
abandoning the term citizen in favour of that of stake-
holder, manage to embrace anyone who has an interest at 
stake, i.e. all those who depend on the policies in place on 
a territory, though they are not citizens of it. Observed 
from this bottom-up perspective, those individuals that 
live on the territory without being residents or having 
legal citizenship also produce participative potential. 
Commuters, who work in the city though they do not 
live there, city users, who neither work nor reside within 
urban boundaries but use the city for cultural, economic 
and social consumerism and, finally, migrants, all come 
under the first type. All these categories are highly influ-
enced by the choices made at a local level for a variety 
of public policies, of which policies for security and pub-
lic order are one of the cornerstones. In brief, they are 
stakeholders who, through participative forms able to 
include their voice, aim at re-equilibrating their position 
compared with the privileged categories of the third gen-
eration metropolises: the citizen-inhabitants, who have 
access as such to the multiple electoral circuits of differ-
ent territorial levels, and the metropolitan businessmen, 
who thanks to their own resources can affect urban poli-
cies by lobbying or by their involvement in the local con-
sultation arenas.
If the institutionalised interaction between central and 
peripheral actors in security pacts may be considered a 
“participative antidote” to the widespread malaise afflict-
ing a large number of the mature polyarchies, what are 
the bonds existing between the territorial structure of 
democratic regimes, the new problems of metropolitan 
political participation and the improvement in the demo-
cratic governance of cities security brought by the new 
instruments of consultation? Assuming that a quality 
democracy cannot avoid assuring that all associates are in 
practice put in a position to use the rights of participation 
and contestation with the same possibility of influenc-
ing public decisions, is it true that the new participatory 
forms, precisely because they tend to “release” participa-
tion from the citizens, to connect it to other aspects of 
territoriality, constitute an actual opportunity of equality 
on important decisions like those on security and pub-
lic order? And how much can they condition the levels 
of affection, loyalty and trust interiorised by citizens with 
respect to the democratic institutions? Do they not risk 
reproducing, in fact increasing, social differences, thus 
negatively affecting the levels of trust in democracy?
Furthermore, what influence can pactional instruments 
have in improving the condition of security perceived by 
citizens, without at the same time weakening the actual 
decision-making capacities to prevent crime? When we 
speak of security policies, are we moving then towards a 
huge qualitative change in terms of greater democratic 
efficiency and equity, or are we embarking, on the other 
hand, on an uncertain path, with the progressive weak-
ening of central government institutions, the arrival of 
new forms of centre-periphery conflicts, and the rise of 
institutionalised mechanisms that, under false pretences, 
make social control pervasive, evil and intolerable?
Conclusions: Does security policy determine 
politics and polity?
Assuming that the relation between individual, democ-
racy, participation and territory tends to become clear, at 
least on a theoretical scale, at the different problematic 
levels of which we have just defined the salient aspects, a 
decisive question concerns the generalisability and appli-
cability of decision-making instruments of a pactional 
type with a decentred nature to improve security (and 
therefore democratic quality) in the different territorial 
contexts in which individuals operate and relate with 
each other, with particular respect for the urban dimen-
sion of social action.
A crucial testing ground to understand if, and up to 
what point, the pactional instrument is a decisive ele-
ment for defining city democracies (Tebaldi and Calaresu 
2015a) is therefore the development of security policies 
in a new polity dimension that sees local power in the 
front line (institutions and groups), apparently accom-
panying the—and in many people’s expectations freed by 
the—traditional central powers of the state.
In the inter-state context, security (let us speak then 
of “internal security”) means, first of all, acting sine cura; 
namely, conducting one’s existence without worrying 
about who might endanger or upset the monopoly of 
legitimate violence of the state through the use of more 
or less unforeseeable, frequent and intense illegitimate 
violence, more or less organised and spread through all 
the instruments usable for the occasion.
If illegitimate violence is effective and not efficiently 
sanctioned, it endangers the territorial, organisational 
and political control of any polity, and tends to threaten 
its values that are considered fundamental (core values). 
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To act in security, therefore, does not just mean to take 
shelter from illegitimate offensive actions, but also to 
eliminate or diminish the risk or threat factors of the val-
ues mentioned above. As we have already observed, the 
public debate on security has spread over the last dec-
ades at two levels concerning both the practical plane of 
policies pursued and the theoretical one of analytical and 
explanatory instruments aimed at justifying these poli-
cies in democratically acceptable terms.
From this point of view, some recent contributions 
appear to have disclosed some aspects of the recent pac-
tional experiments with urban security that seem to fuel 
more than a few doubts about their innovative capacity. 
Security pacts, far from redefining the governance of 
urban security in a substantial sense, basically propose 
again, with new inter-organisational procedures, the tra-
ditional situation and logics, founded on the dependence 
of peripheral powers on central government bodies. With 
all the consequences concerning the possibility of intro-
ducing new governance instruments, more sensitive to 
urban transformation and to the needs of security that 
this transformation introduces into the public debate and 
public agenda. Without, however, penalising the appli-
cations for participative equality that the disadvantaged 
sectors of the urban community insistently claim.
What we have analysed up to now leads us neverthe-
less to formulate new questions and new interpretative 
hypotheses inherent in the development of public secu-
rity policies.
Consistent with what Lowi states (1964) on the acti-
vation of specific arenas of power and public decision-
making, it is fair to conjecture that certain types of 
policies—including primarily security, a crucial element 
in peaceful, organised co-existence, especially in the 
urban environment—could determine the features of pol-
itics and the actual structure of democratic quality.
Up to what point, then, can democracies, at any level of 
territorial sub-division, accept the temporary or lasting 
suppression of some kinds of freedom, just to raise their 
level of internal security in metropolitan governance? 
Can it be said that the security policy tends to determine 
both the politics of democratic quality and its polity, 
namely the territorial criteria that legitimise participa-
tion? Can we conjecture that the need for responsiveness 
and accountability, when there is a primary necessity 
like security at stake, tends to relegate other dimensions 
of democratic quality, such as the freedom and equal-
ity of popular participation, to second place and thus to 
redefine the ties between democracy, participation and 
territory? Looking at it through the lens of urban secu-
rity policies, it does not seem risky to state that the spa-
tial prism of democracy, first evoked due to the multiple 
facets into which it manages to break down the concept 
of participation, tends on the other hand to drastically 
reduce, thus understood, its refractive capacity.
Metaphors aside, what seems to emerge from our 
reflection is the fact that participative freedom and equal-
ity, when the primary good of security is endangered, 
may be taken back to obviously more narrow-minded 
territorial principles of the concept of state citizen (the 
metropolitan area or the city rather than the district or 
single street of residence), without, on the other hand, 
managing to give voice to the interests of those excluded: 
who, if anything, may be excessively penalised precisely 
by the participation of the few who have new participa-
tory channels available.
To speak of decentralisation, in this sense, is not mis-
leading. Territorial belonging, once more and even if 
remodelled from the bottom, may hinder participation 
making it unequal; this tends to be aggravated when 
the criterion of territorial belonging merges with other 
attributable characters of a cultural type (ethnic, reli-
gious, linguistic, etc.) raising reasonable doubts about 
the democratic quality of those collectivises that, feeling 
their security at danger, do not hesitate to belittle and 
delegitimise the participation of minority groups consid-
ered antagonistic.
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